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Abstract 
 
Academic contributions on the demutualization of stock exchanges so far have been 
predominantly devoted to social welfare issues, whereas there is scarce empirical 
literature referring to the impact of a governance change on the exchange itself. 
While there is consensus that the case for demutualization is predominantly driven 
by the need to improve the exchange's competitiveness in a changing business 
environment, it remains unclear how different governance regimes actually affect 
stock exchange performance. Some authors propose that a public listing is the best 
suited governance arrangement to improve an exchange's competitiveness. By 
employing a panel data set of 28 stock exchanges for the years 1999-2003 we seek to 
shed light on this topic by comparing the efficiency and productivity of exchanges 
with differing governance arrangements. For this purpose we calculate in a first step 
individual efficiency and productivity values via DEA. In a second step we regress 
the derived values against variables that  - amongst others - map the institutional 
arrangement of the exchanges in order to determine efficiency and productivity 
differences between (1) mutuals (2) demutualized but customer-owned exchanges 
and (3) publicly listed and thus at least partly outsider-owned exchanges. We find 
evidence that demutualized exchanges exhibit higher technical efficiency than 
mutuals. However, they perform relatively poor as far as productivity growth is 
concerned. Furthermore, we find no evidence that publicly listed exchanges possess 
higher efficiency and productivity values than demutualized exchanges with a 
customer-dominated structure. We conclude that the merits of outside ownership lie 
possibly in other areas such as solving conflicts of interest between too heterogeneous 
members. 
 
Keywords: exchanges, demutualization, effciency, DEA, Malmquist-Productivity, 
Tobit panel data regressions, bootstrapping 
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 1Introduction
Severalstockexchangeshavebeenoverhaulingtheircorporategovernancestruc-
tureasaresultofamoredemandingcompetitiveenvironment.Acombinationof
factorsledtoincreasedpressureontheexchanges'businesses.(1)Thechanging
investmentbehavioroftheir(end)customers,whichbecamelesshome-biasedand
soughttodiversifytheircapitalglobally,resultedinincreasedcompetitionforor-
der°owamongstexchanges.(2)ParticularlyinEurope,thederegulationofthe
¯nancialmarketsbyinitiativessuchastheSingleEuropeanMarket,butalsoby
theBigBangreformsinUK,openedthepathforincreasedcompetitivepressure
ontheincumbentinstitutions.(3)Yet,thegreatestimpactonstockexchangecom-
petitioncanbeattributedtothedevelopmentsininformationtechnologyandthe
reductionincommunicationcosts,whichresultedintheemergenceofnewways
totradesecurities.Remotemembership,electronicorderbooktrading,electronic
communicationnetworks,andtheinternalizationoforder°owbyintermediaries
becameallviablethreatstothetraditional°oortrading.
ThestockexchangeinStockholmwasthe¯rsttoreactonthischangingenviron-
mentbyrestructuringitscorporategovernanceintheearly1990s.Asmostother
exchanges,itwasorganizedasamutual,whichusuallycomprisesaone-member
one-votecontrolstructureandanot-for-pro¯torientationoftheirvenue.1Inthe
processofthisdemutualization,theychangedtheirinstitutionalsettingtowards
apro¯t-orientedone-share,one-votestructureaswe¯nditinaregularcapitalist
¯rm.Severalotherexchangesfollowedthesuit.
However,onecanobservethatsomeexchangesmerelyrestructuredtheirvoting
systemandalteredtheobjectivefunctiontowardspro¯t-orientation,butmostly
retainedtheiroldshareholders.Hence,thistypeofreorganizationdidnotinvolvea
changeinthetypeofowners,althoughaninternalreallocationofsharesandvotes
mayhaveoccurredinordertomorecloselyalignthecustomers'votingpowerwith
theirrespectivevolumeofbusiness.Asaconsequence,theseexchangesbasically
remaineddominatedbytheircustomers.Otherexchangeshavedecidedtogoone
stepfurther.Theysoldasubstantialportionoftheirsharestooutsidersviaapublic
listing.Thus,theirgovernancehasbecomemoreorlessdominatedbyoutsiders,
i.e.non-customerowners,whoforemosthavea¯nancialinterestintheexchange.2
Figure1demonstratesthegrowingprevalenceofdemutualizedandlistedexchanges
vis-µa-vismutualexchangesintheindustry.Thechartdisplaysthisdevelopment
forthe50largeststockexchangesduringtheyears1999and2003.Thenumber
ofexchangesthatareorganizedasmutualsfellfrom40to25whilethesumof
demutualizedandpubliclylistedexchangesrosefrom10to25inthesameperiod.
Exchangesundergoingthedemutualizationprocesshavedonesoinexpectation
ofimprovedcompetitiveness.AsurveyofexchangesconductedbyBTAConsulting
andpresentedbyScullion(2001)revealsthemainmotivesofandexpectedbene-
1Themutuals'objectivefunctionwasusuallytomaximizetheirmembers'utility.SeepartIII
inHansmann(1996)foranelaborateanalysisofthesecustomer-owned¯rms.
2Inhiscontribution,Aggarwal(2002)describesthevariousstepsoftheprocessandviewsthe
publiclistingofanexchangewithawidelydispersedshareholderbaseastheultimatestepofthis
restructuring.
1Figure 1: Governance Type of Exchanges 1999-2003
¯ts from demutualization. These are - among others - (1) to tap new sources of
capital which is possibly needed to modernize their trading systems (2) to pursue
business opportunities unconstrained by vested interest issues (3) to achieve better
cost control and (4) to increase °exibility, e±ciency and competitiveness. Scullion
further argues in his contribution that demutualization is now regarded as the key
solution to all the problems related with mutual exchanges.3 In order to achieve
the full bene¯ts of demutualization he points out that
Demutualisation is not simply [...] turning into a for pro¯t entity owned
by members. A truly demutualised exchange would be better placed if
it were able to unlock its hidden value for all stakeholders in order to
maximise its potential market capitalisation and shareholder value.4
A report published by the OECD takes a similarly positive stance on the e®ect of
outside owners for demutualized exchanges. They note that
Being listed on a stock exchange is likely to improve the value of stock ex-
changes, as exchanges are urged to create value for their own sharehold-
ers through improvement of their structure to operate more e±ciently.5
In academia, the demutualization process has been so far predominantly an-
alyzed from a social welfare perspective. The most prominent theoretical con-
tribution is by Hart and Moore (1996) who discusses under which circumstances
of competition and broker composition the migration from a mutual towards an
outsider-owned for-pro¯t exchange is socially bene¯cial. Hart and Moore's simple
pricing model demonstrates that an outsider-owned governance structure is socially
preferable over a mutual structure when there exists a relatively high level of com-
petition or a relatively high degree of heterogeneity6 among members. An empirical
3Confer Scullion (2001, p. xxxii).
4Confer Scullion (2001, p. xxix).
5Confer OECD (2003, p.104).
6Hart and Moore refer to heterogeneity in terms of the skewness of the members' size distrib-
ution
2contribution is made by Krishnamurti, Sequeira, and Fangjian (2002) who compare
the market quality of the Bombay Stock Exchange, a mutual, with that of the Na-
tional Stock Exchange, a demutualized trading venue. Another strand of literature
devotes itself with regulatory issues that emerged, since some of the exchanges un-
dergoing the demutualization process traditionally regulate their trading markets
themselves. This raised concerns by industry participants whether the commercial
interests of a for-pro¯t exchange would collide with its monitoring e®ort to ensure
fair conduct of trading. Authors such as Pirrong (2000), Karmel (2000) and Elliott
(2002), to name a few, have made important contributions in this ¯eld.
However, the impact of demutualization and outside ownership on the exchange's
performance has so far been scarcely subject to academic literature. This is sur-
prising, since the decision to demutualize and even to go public has far-reaching
consequences for the exchanges. Here, both ¯nancial and strategic aspects are rel-
evant. Take for example the costs that are associated with an IPO. According to
their annual reports, Deutsche BÄ orse and Euronext paid 36.8 million and 46 million
euros for their respective °oatation. Although the proceeds received from an IPO
naturally more than recouped these costs, the IPO-costs amounted to 3.7% of the
new proceeds in Deutsche BÄ orse's case and even to 12.7% for Euronext. Besides
these one-o® costs there are also additional running costs such as stricter disclosure
requirements. A strategic implication is that an exchange can be more easily taken
over by other institutions. Thus, the main bene¯t of demutualization and going
public, i.e. improving the exchange's performance, should be somehow noticeable.
We are aware of one paper that is directly concerned with the impact of de-
mutualization on stock exchange performance and two further contributions that
analyze stock exchange performance in general. The paper directly related to stock
exchange performance is by Mendiola and O'Hara (2003) who analyze the share
performance and valuation of publicly listed exchanges after their IPO compared
to other listed ¯rms and other IPOs. While their results are very interesting in
their own right, in particular their ¯nding that there exists a positive link between
the fraction of equity sold to outside investors and stock exchange performance, it
does not provide a performance comparison with exchanges that are not listed due
to the apparent lack of share price information for these exchanges. Furthermore,
this approach cannot provide any insights to the performance of an exchange prior
to its public listing. Therefore, the use of share prices as indicator of performance
is rather limited. As a consequence, a potential method that considers governance
di®erences among exchanges must be workable with data that is available for all
exchanges irrespective of their governance regime. The two other papers we iden-
ti¯ed are written by Schmiedel and employ frontier e±ciency methods in order to
derive relative e±ciency values of an exchange and which do not incorporate share
price information but information on accounting data, sta® size and transaction
data among others. For his two papers he makes use of two di®erent methods of
frontier analysis. While Schmiedel (2001) employs a parametric stochastic frontier
model to evaluate the cost e±ciency of European stock exchanges, he applies a non-
3parametric method in the second paper (Schmiedel (2002)).7 Schmiedel's ¯ndings
on stock exchange governance are ambiguous, however. His ¯rst paper, which con-
trols for demutualized exchanges within the regression, displays a positive impact
of demutualization on cost e±ciency8, whereas his second paper indicates that the
mean of productivity gains is higher for mutual exchanges9.
As already mentioned, the primary focus of Schmiedel's papers is not to elabo-
rate on di®erences in exchange governance, which is probably also due to the rather
limited number of demutualized exchanges in the time period of his analysis (until
1999). Therefore, the aim of our paper is to ¯ll this vacancy by conducting an e±-
ciency analysis that devotes particular attention on exchange governance and which
uses more recent data. As in Schmiedel (2002), we will also employ a non-parametric
approach to calculate relative e±ciency scores, albeit using a broader set of output
variables. Furthermore, in contrast to his proceeding, we will go a step further by
regressing the derived estimations for e±ciency and productivity against a set of
factors mapping the framework in which the respective exchanges are embedded.
This procedure will then highlight whether there is a signi¯cant impact of di®erent
governance structures on the performance of the stock exchanges.
The papers is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology used in
our paper. Section 3 presents the employed data and our results. An interpretation
as well as the robustness of our ¯ndings will also be discussed here. Section 4 con-
cludes our paper by summing up our ¯ndings and drawing some policy implications.
2 Methodology
This section discusses the methodology used in the paper. The main aim as out-
lined in section 1 is to isolate the e®ects of demutualization and outside ownership
on stock exchange e±ciency and productivity. For that matter we initially provide
an overview of Data Envelopment Analysis in section 2.1, the method used to cal-
culate the exchanges' e±ciency values. Section 2.2 sketches the measurement of
productivity by using the Malmquist Productivity index. Readers familiar with the
methods may want to skip these sections. Section 2.3 describes how the speci¯c
e®ects of further factors such as di®erent governance regimes can be disentangled
via regression analysis. The structure of the employed regressions will be presented
in section 2.4.
2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which bases on linear mathematical program-
ming, was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). Using their algo-
rithm enables the calculation of relative technical and economic e±ciency values
7Both methodologies are widely accepted and were already used for e±ciency measurement
of ¯nancial institutions by a myriad of other papers. Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide an
comprehensive survey on this topic.
8Confer Schmiedel (2001, p.22)
9Confer table 7, the 'Malmquist index'-column for demutualized and cooperative exchanges on
page 26.
4for similar entities which process multiple inputs of resources into multiple outputs
of products or services.10 The e±ciency of each entity under evaluation is deter-
mined by calculating the deviation each organization has from an e±cient frontier.
The frontier itself is set up as a piece-wise linear combination of best-practice ob-
servations spanning a convex production possibilities set. The computed e±ciency
value is thus a relative measure as it quanti¯es the performance of each entity in
comparison to a set of "best"-performing peers.
2.1.1 Characteristics
DEA is a non-parametric approach that has no predetermined functional relation
between inputs and outputs, i.e. there are no a priori weights attached to these
factors. Instead, the weighting of the factors that are involved in the production
process is endogenously optimized for each decision making unit (DMU)11 individu-
ally. By doing so, the weighting factors of the inputs and outputs, i.e. the underlying
production technology, can vary substantially among the DMUs. This allows each
DMU to attain the highest possible e±ciency value subject to the constraint that
the e±ciency values of all remaining DMUs stay within the de¯ned boundaries of
the e±ciency measure when using the same weighting scheme. This procedure en-
sures that a DMU's activity can be justi¯ed from an economic point of view as it
assumes that the respective decision makers act according to certain factor prices
and thus give appropriate weights to the employed inputs and produced outputs in
line with the notion of striving for maximum e±ciency. The resulting °exibility in
the production function is an advantage whenever the true functional relationship
between inputs and outputs is unknown. This is clearly the case in the stock ex-
change industry so that it seems sensible to allow for di®erent types of production
functions during the analysis.
DEA is particularly useful in analyzing not-for pro¯t entities by conceding to
the measurement of technical e±ciency. This liberates the analysis from assuming a
potentially ill-de¯ned economic objective function such as pro¯t motivation. Also,
information on prices, a prerequisite for calculating economic e±ciency, can be
"suspect at best and missing at worst"12 in a not-for-pro¯t environment. Focusing
on technical e±ciency moreover creates a level playing ¯eld between DMUs with
di®erent organizational background. Thus, a comparison on the basis of technical
e±ciency should be more appropriate to assess the relative performance between
for-pro¯t and not-for-pro¯t DMUs from the same industry.13
10The terms technical and economic e±ciency were coined by Farrell (1957). In his de¯nition,
technical e±ciency is achieved when an increase in any output requires a reduction in at least one
other output or an increase in at least one other input and if a reduction in at least one input
requires an increase in at least one other input or a reduction in at least one output. Economic
e±ciency, on the other hand, incorporates information on prices for the respective inputs and
outputs and an economic objective to be pursued such as cost minimization or revenue maximiza-
tion. It is achieved by implementing the cost minimizing or revenue maximizing production plan.
Confer Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p. 9-18) for an illustrative discussion of these concepts.
11The term "DMU" was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1981) and has been widely
adopted by other authors.
12Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p.26)
13Confer Pestieau and Tulkens (1993, p.300-301).
5A major limitation of DEA is that it does not account for random error. Poten-
tial noise may evolve from inconsistencies in the input and output ¯gures, diverging
accounting practices and/or di®ering accounting standards or random events that
either positively or adversely in°uence a DMU's performance. Furthermore, noise
may not only shift the e±ciency of the concerned DMU. It might also have an
alternating in°uence on all other DMUs when the noise-a®ected DMU is a mem-
ber of the e±cient frontier. As a result, econometric methods such as Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) are sometimes seen in a more favorable light among em-
pirical researchers in order to assess the e±ciency of ¯rms.14 But these parametric
approaches have their own limitations. Wilson and Simar (1995) present several
arguments why DEA is not dominated by these methods: Not only do parametric
methods require an a priori speci¯cation of the used technology, they also need
to predispose the noise and the ine±ciency process. Thus, potential errors in the
speci¯cation of the functional form may be mixed up with the DMU's ine±ciency.
Moreover, the incorporated noise term only allows for measurement error in the
regressand while bias and inconsistency may also exist in the explaining variables.
They therefore conclude that "the presence of a noise term in the parametric models
may represent only a slight advantage, if at all."15
2.1.2 The DEA-model
Consider DMU1 from a sample of n decision making units. Assume that this
DMU uses one type of input and generates one type of output. Then, taking the
output-to-input-ratio will not be very informative - save for the fact that a higher
ratio generally indicates higher e±ciency - unless DMU1's ratio is compared to
e±ciency values of the other n ¡ 1 DMUs. Calculating the ratios for all n DMUs
and normalizing them16 yields relative e±ciency values that can be interpreted in
a meaningful way.
The multiplier and envelopment program The basic DEA input-oriented
model17 introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) is based on the same
simple intuition, but generalizes the ratio for the multiple input and multiple out-
put case.18 They calculate an e±ciency ratio by assigning an e±ciency-optimized
weighting scheme to the respective outputs and inputs so that one aggregated 'vir-
tual' output value is divided by one aggregated 'virtual' input value. To be more
14Confer for example Schmidt (1985) who calls DEA "non-statistical". Yet, Banker (1993)
provides a statistical underpinning for the methodology.
15Wilson and Simar (1995, p.3-4)
16This is accomplished by setting a maximum achievable value of one. Hence, perfect e±ciency
is achieved at a ratio of one while a value of zero indicates absolute ine±ciency.
17Input-oriented models calculate the DMU's e±ciency in terms of the employed quantity of
inputs in order to produce a given level of output. Output-oriented models on the other hand
determine the e±ciency by focusing on the level of produced outputs holding the level of inputs
constant. Thus, the choice of the model depends on whether the emphasis is on input reduction
or output augmentation. It is reasonable to use an input-oriented model when analyzing the stock
exchange industry as the inputs can be in°uenced more directly by the management than the
"outputs" which are predominantly in°uenced by market demand.
18Several re¯nements of DEA have emerged in the literature. An overview provides chapter 3
of Charnes, Cooper, Lewin, and Seiford (1997).
6precise, assume that DMU1 has an (m£1) input vector X1 = fxl1g with l = 1;:::;m
and an (s £ 1) output vector Y1 = fyr1g with r = 1;:::;s.19 Further assume that
there exists a weighting vector º for the inputs and a second vector ¹ for the outputs
with corresponding dimensions. Then, the non-linear program
max
º;¹
¹0Y1
º0X1
(1)
s:t:
¹0Yi
º0Xi
· 1 8i = 1;:::;n
¹;º ¸ 0
states that the e±ciency of DMU1, i.e. the output-input-ratio weighted by the
transposed multipliers ¹0 and º0, is maximized by optimizing the weighting factors
subject to the n constraints requiring each DMU's e±ciency value not to exceed the
value of one when the same weighting scheme is used.20 However, the non-linear
program has an in¯nite number of solutions. By adding the constraint º0X1 = 1
to the program, the denominator of the e±ciency ratio can be normalized to one
so that the program's objective function becomes linear. The linearization of the
constraints is accomplished by multiplying º0Xi to constraint i 8i = 1;:::;n. The
resulting linear 'multiplier' program then has the following form:
max
º;¹ ¹0Y1 (2)
s:t: º0X1 = 1
¹0Yi · º0Xi 8i = 1;:::;n
¹;º ¸ 0
This program is solved n times, i.e. for each DMU individually. When using matrix
notation and employing a (s £ n) matrix of outputs denoted as Y, and a (m £ n)
matrix of inputs denoted as X the program in (2) can be written as:
max
º;¹
¹0Y1 (3)
s:t: º0X1 = 1
Y0¹ · X0º
¹;º ¸ 0
The program now yields a unique solution for º¤ and ¹¤.21
19The observations are all non-negative, i.e. xl1;yr1 ¸ 0 8l;r.
20The fourth line in equation (1) requires the multipliers to be non-negative. It is assumed that
the technology under consideration is convex and has the property of disposability in its strong
version.
21Linear programs are solved by the Simplex-Algorithm.
7The dual program The dual of equation (3), termed as the "envelopment-
problem", is usually preferred to the multiplier problem due to lesser calculation
e®ort.22 It also provides a di®erent point of view to the problem. In particular, the
envelopment problem
min
µ;¸
µ (4)
s:t: µX1 ¸ X¸
Y1 · Y¸
¸ ¸ 0
solves for the highest possible radial contraction, i.e. the minimum value of µ, with
which the analyzed input vector (X1) uses at least as many inputs as a linear combi-
nation of observations from the reference or best practice set (X¸) while producing
(Y1) at most as many outputs as the linear combination of best performing peers
(Y¸).
Assumptions on technology The presented linear program has a relatively
strong assumption about its underlying technology. It restricts the input-output-
process to a constant returns-to-scale (CRS) environment. A slightly re¯ned version
introduced by Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) mitigates this assumption and
calculates e±ciency scores in a variable returns-to-scale (VRS) surrounding, i.e. it
allows for di®ering returns-to-scale characteristics for di®erent levels of input-output
combinations. By adding a further constraint to problem (4), namely 1¸ = 1,
the reference point of the analyzed DMU is now required to be a convex linear
combination of e±cient DMUs while this was not necessary in the CRS-program.
Figure 2 illustrates the di®erence between the two technologies for a two-dimensional
one-input (x), one-output model (y).
As mentioned earlier, the ine±ciency of a DMU is measured by its deviation from
the e±cient frontier. As this paper considers input-oriented models, this translates
into calculating the maximum possible contraction in inputs while holding the out-
put level constant. DMUs that are situated on the e±cient frontier are best practice
observations and have no deviation and hence an e±ciency value of one. Employ-
ing a VRS-frontier, which is indicated as a dashed bold line, the DMUs are closer
enveloped by the frontier and thus yield higher overall e±ciency values. This can
be seen when referring to DMUs 1 and 8: While they are part of the VRS-reference
set, i.e. their e±ciency value is one, they do not belong to the best practice peer
group when using a CRS-environment (solid bold line). The dotted line indicates
their deviations from this frontier and thus their ine±ciency. For DMUs 2, 6 and 7
the distances of the dotted line and dashed line need to be summed up in order to
calculate their ine±ciency in the CRS-case. DMU 4 is a special case in the sense
that its e±ciency value does not change since its reference point remains a convex
22As the number of DMUs (= n) is usually larger than the sum of the inputs and outputs (m+s)
used in the program, the dual needs to calculate n ¡ (m + s) fewer constraint.
8Figure 2: Envelopment Surface with CRS and VRS
combination of the e±cient DMUs 3 and 5 for both technology assumptions. Note
further that the e±cient frontier in the VRS-case exhibits increasing returns-to-
scale for input-output combinations that are between those of DMUs 1 and 3, while
there exists a decreasing returns-to-scale environment for combinations that are in
the range of DMUs 5 and 8. For our analysis, we will employ both constant and
variable returns-to-scale technologies to depict the exchange's 'production process'
since we do not have any knowledge on the underlying scale attributes in the ex-
change industry.
The right choice of variables The e±ciency value introduced in this section
is of static nature, i.e. it provides a snapshot of the exchanges' technical e±ciency
at a certain point in time. However, depending on the input and output variables
incorporated in the DEA-calculation, the e±ciency scores might have a bias towards
certain DMUs. As an example, consider omitted output variables that only some
DMUs in the sample produce. If we cannot adjust the input variables of these DMUs
accordingly in such a manner that we merely include the amount of inputs devoted
to the outputs considered in the DEA-calculation and disregard those inputs that
are used for the omitted outputs, the unadjusted input value will be too high. As
a result the group of DMUs that does not produce the omitted output will be seen
in a more favorable light ceteris paribus. Hence, their e±ciency scores might be
"too good" vis-µ a-vis the DMUs that do produce the omitted variable. This point
is signi¯cant for the analysis in this paper as stock exchanges indeed vary in their
output range. We mitigate this problem by calculating DEA-scores for the broadest
possible output-set, for it is easier to obtain information on additional outputs that
can be included in the calculation than to acquire a detailed breakdown of the used
9inputs in order to adjust them for the omitted outputs.23
2.2 Malmquist Productivity Index
Besides measuring the relative e±ciency levels of a DMU for a certain year we can
also compare year-on-year changes in technical e±ciency, i.e. its total factor pro-
ductivity change. A convenient method to measure productivity change over time
is the calculation of the Malmquist-productivity-index, as it bases on similar linear
programming techniques. Introduced by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982),
it gained additional appeal when FÄ are et al. re¯ned the method by decomposing
the productivity change into two separate e®ects, namely the change in e±ciency
and technological progress. This section sketches the fundamental issues.24
Consider the left panel of ¯gure 3 (CRS) where a DMU's one-input (x), one-
output (y) constant returns-to-scale production process is depicted for two subse-
quent periods t and t+1 with respective e±cient production frontiers Tt and Tt+1.
Irrespective of the observed input-output-combinations (xt;yt) and (xt+1;yt+1) the
slopes of the two frontiers indicate whether technological progress has occurred from
period t to t + 1. As the slope of Tt+1 is steeper than that of Tt, technology must
have progressed, for it is possible in t + 1 to produce the same amount of output
with fewer inputs. This can readily be seen when focusing on points b and c in the
¯gure which determine the inputs that are required to produce the same output
level yt in the respective periods. Thus, using technology Tt+1 enables the same
output to be converted by (0b¡0c) fewer inputs. To see the change in e±ciency, one
needs to take a closer look at the actual input-output combinations, i.e. (xt;yt) and
(xt+1;yt+1) of the DMU. Apparently, neither of the two is produced in an e±cient
manner. Note, that the points b and f represent the minimum input levels for the
given output levels yt and yt+1. As the deviation from the frontier has increased in
period t+1 compared to period t, there was a decline in e±ciency for this DMU. In
total, the two factors that comprise the productivity change of the DMU are run-
ning in opposite directions in our illustration. The right panel (VRS) depicts the
case for variable returns-to-scale and can be analyzed analogously. Here, Tt ½ Tt+1
which again implies that technological progress must have occurred. Note also,
that the deviations of the observed input-output combinations from the respective
frontiers and consequently the ine±ciencies have decreased as the VRS-technology
"envelops" the observations more closely.
In order to determine the aggregate change in productivity, FÄ are et al. de¯ne
input distance functions - that are the reciprocals of Farrell's technical e±ciency
measure - with respect to the two adjacent time periods in such a way that they
measure the maximum proportional change in inputs required to make (xt+1;yt+1)
feasible in relation to technology Tt and make (xt;yt) feasible in relation to Tt+1.25
23In practice, this is very likely since information on the exact relationship between inputs and
outputs is usually not available. Confer also section 3 on this issue.
24Confer FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994, p.68-75) and Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt
(1993, p.50-53) for a more detailed discussion.
25The methodology of FÄ are et al. for the output-oriented index is adapted here for the input-
oriented approach. Confer FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994, p.69-70)
10Figure 3: Input-oriented Malmquist approach for CRS and VRS
They de¯ne the productivity index as the geometric mean of two mixed period
distance functions26:
M(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
s
Dt(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt(xt;yt)
¢
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt+1(xt;yt)
(5)
where the ¯rst factor uses time period t and the second factor time period t + 1 as
the respective reference technology. Equation (5) can be transformed into equation
(6) which uncovers the two decomposed e®ects stated earlier.
M(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt(xt;yt)
¢
s
Dt(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
¢
Dt(xt;yt)
Dt+1(xt;yt)
(6)
The factor outside the square root indicates the change in e±ciency as it is equiva-
lent to the ratio of Farrell's technical e±ciency for periods t and t + 1. The factor
under the square root displays the geometric mean of shifts in technology at output
levels yt and yt+1, respectively. The calculation of the distance functions can again
be illustrated by ¯gure 3:
M(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
0d=0f
0a=0b
s
0d=0e
0d=0f
¢
0a=0b
0a=0c
(7)
Note that for both factors, a value of unity indicates no change whereas a value
above (below) unity signi¯es a positive (negative) change in technology and e±-
ciency. Note further that exchanges that possess low e±ciency value will possess
26The measurement of productivity in the VRS-case has to be treated with caution since the
results could be °awed as was noted by Grifell-Tatj¶ e and Lovell (1995). Additionally, FÄ are,
Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994, p.73 FN 15) note that solutions from the mixed-period
distance functions might not be feasible.
11a larger potential to improve their productivity than exchanges that are already
highly e±cient. In the extreme, an exchange that is fully e±cient in two adja-
cent periods cannot improve its technical e±ciency at all. Therefore, we need to
treat comparisons between productivity gains of highly e±cient and less e±cient
exchanges with caution.27
For the m-input/s-output case, the following four DEA-like linear programs need
to be solved for all i = 1;:::;n DMUs in order to calculate the respective changes in
productivity28, keeping in mind that the required input distance functions are the
reciprocal of Farrell's input-oriented technical e±ciency measure. Thus,
[Dt(xt
1;yt
1)]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (8)
s:t: µXt
1 ¸ X
t¸
Y t
1 · Y
t¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0
gives the distance function Dt
1(xt
1;yt
1) of DMU 1. Similarly, D
t+1
1 (x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 ) is
calculated by substituting the indices t by t+1 in equation (8). The remaining two
linear problems are mixed period calculations meaning that the reference technology
is constructed from data of period t (and t + 1, respectively), whereas the input-
output-combinations to be evaluated are from period t + 1 (and t, respectively).
Hence, they provide solutions for Dt
1(x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 ) and D
t+1
1 (xt
1;yt
1):
[Dt(x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 )]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (9)
s:t: µX
t+1
1 ¸ X
t¸
Y
t+1
1 · Y
t¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0
and
[Dt+1(xt
1;yt
1)]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (10)
s:t: µXt
1 ¸ X
t+1¸
Y t
1 · Y
t+1¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0
27In our second stage regressions we will control for this e®ect by employing the exchanges'
e±ciency values as additional independent control variable.
28Confer Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p. 180-186).
122.3 Two-stage approach for assessing e±ciency di®erences
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 presented our approach to calculate the DEA-e±ciency and
Malmquist productivity values. We so far employed input and output variables
which we assume are directly related to the operations of an exchange and are
thus under the direct control of the responsible management. Additional factors,
which cannot be controlled directly by the management, such as di®erent corporate
governance schemes, have so far been not incorporated in our analysis. There
are two di®erent approaches in the literature that provide a linkage between the
"controllable" operational and "non-controllable" framework factors.
On the one hand, there are re¯nements to the DEA that allow for the direct in-
clusion of framework factors. These so-called one-stage approaches either calculate
DEA-values for each group of DMUs separately and that are in turn projected on
the respective e±cient frontier29 or they calculate the e±ciency values for di®erent
benchmark frontiers depending in which non-controllable factor environment the re-
spective DMUs are.30 However, there are shortcomings to this approach. The major
drawback is that DEA calculates the e±ciency values for each subsample of DMUs
separately. As a result the proportion of DMUs that lie on the e±cient frontier
increases which in consequence dilutes the explanatory power of the method.31
The method used here follows a two-stage process. Stage one encompasses the
calculation of e±ciency and productivity values as outlined in sections 2.1 and
2.2 and is based solely on operational inputs and outputs. In the second stage, the
resulting values for e±ciency and productivity are used as statistical estimators in a
regression analysis. These estimators are regressed against framework factors that
may also have in°uence on exchange e±ciency and productivity. The procedure
therefore enables us to disentangle the individual e®ects of these variables and
provides a solid basis to judge whether there are signi¯cant di®erences in e±ciency
and productivity along the varying governance types.
2.4 Regression analysis
Using e±ciency scores as dependent variable Using the DEA-scores as es-
timators of e±ciency in a regression analysis entails the problem that they are
truncated from above at a maximum value of one. Hence, instead of a regular OLS
regression, which would produce biased results, we follow Dusansky and Wilson
(1994) and McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) who apply a Tobit regression in order
to deal with truncated observations. Taking our panel data structure into account
we use the following general Tobit model:
29Confer Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1981) who provide an example for the use of DEA with
non-discretionary variables to di®erentiate between not-for pro¯t and for-pro¯t ¯rms.
30See Banker and Morey (1986).
31Confer Steinmann (2002, p.34-35). Steinmann also provides further disadvantages of one-stage
approaches.
13EFFi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t if EFF ¤
i;t < 1 (11)
EFFi;t = 1 if EFF ¤
i;t ¸ 1
where ²i;t = ®i + ´i;t
Here, EFFi;t is the e±ciency value of exchange i in period t derived from the
DEA-calculation, EFF¤
i;t is the true but unobservable e±ciency of exchange i in
period t, Xi;t = [1 x0] is an ((1 £ (K + 1)) vector of K framework variables plus
one and ¯ is a ((L+1)£1) vector of parameters. The error term is decomposed into
an time-invariant individual e®ect of the exchange denoted as ®i and an independent
e®ect ´i;t which is assumed to be uncorrelated with Xi;t. Thus, we will employ a
random e®ects model. The K = 10 framework variables used in this regression will
be introduced and discussed in section 3.2. In total, we regress for i = f1;:::;n =
28g £ t = f1:::T = 5g = 140 observations.
Using productivity values as dependent variable In a similar manner, we
will regress the framework variables against the results from the productivity analy-
sis. The variables employed will then explain the impact on overall Malmquist pro-
ductivity (MQ) as well as on the two decomposed e®ects, namely on the change in
technical e±ciency (¢EFF) and on technological progress (¢TECH). Since there
is no truncation in the productivity variables, we will employ a standard panel
regression out¯t. Thus, we obtain three regression models:
MQi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (12)
¢EFFi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (13)
¢TECHi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (14)
where ²i;t = ®i + ´i;t respectively
Here, MQi;t, ¢EFFi;t and ¢TECHi;t represent the values of Malmquist pro-
ductivity, change in technical e±ciency and technological progress of exchange i
from period t¡1 to period t, respectively. Again, Xi;t = [1 x0] is a ((1£(K +1))
vector of K framework variables plus one and ¯ is an ((L + 1) £ 1) vector of para-
meters. In these regressions we will use a ¯xed e®ects model, since the Hausman
tests mostly reject the hypothesis that there is no systematic di®erence between
the ¯xed and the random e®ects estimation - as we will see in section 3.3.2.32 We
will make use of the same K = 10 framework variables as in regression (11). Addi-
tionally, we will employ the calculated EFF-value of period t¡1 of each exchange
as a further independent variable in order to control for the fact that less e±cient
32The Hausman speci¯cation test veri¯es whether the coe±cients of a regression model with
random e®ects are unbiased compared to the coe±cients of a ¯xed e®ects model. The underly-
ing assumption is that ¯xed e®ects models always produce consistent but potentially ine±cient
estimators whereas a random e®ects model is always e±cient but can be inconsistent. Confer for
example Johnston and DiNardo (1997, p.403-404) or Greene (1993, p.479-480) for further details.
14exchanges can potentially improve their productivity by a larger extent than highly
e±cient exchanges.33 Since the dependent variables are calculated by comparing
two adjacent periods, i.e. MQt consumes data from periods t and t-1, we "lose"
one period and have therefore four observations per DMU. Thus, we regress for
i = f1;:::;n = 28g £ t = f1:::(T ¡ 1) = 4g = 112 observations.34
3 Data and empirical results
3.1 The sample
The study employs a balanced panel data set that includes 28 stock exchanges for
a ¯ve year time period (1999-2003) as can be seen in table 1.
No. Exchange Region Governance Avg. World
Mutual/State Demutualized Listed Market Share
1 BOVESPA Americas
p
- - 0.2%
2 Lima Americas
p
- - 0.0%
3 NASDAQ Americas - 2001 - 25.7%
4 NYSE Americas
p
- - 25.1%
5 Toronto TSX Americas - 2000 2002 1.1%
6 Budapest Europe/Africa - 2002 - 0.0%
7 Copenhagen Europe/Africa - 1996 - 0.2%
8 Deutsche BÄ orse Europe/Africa - 2000 2001 3.7%
9 Euronexty Europe/Africa - 2000 2001 7.7%
10 Hellenic* Europe/Africa - 1999 2000 0.2%
11 Istanbul Europe/Africa
p
- - 0.1%
12 Johannesburg JSE Europe/Africa
p
- - 0.2%
13 London Europe/Africa - 2000 2001 10.0%
14 Malta Europe/Africa
p
- - 0.0%
15 Oslo Europe/Africa - 2001 - 0.2%
16 OM Gruppen Europe/Africa - 1993 1998 1.0%
17 SWX Zurich Europe/Africa - 2002 - 1.5%
18 Vienna Europe/Africa - 1998 - 0.0%
19 Warsaw Europe/Africa
p
- - 0.0%
20 Australian Asia/Paci¯c - 1998 1998 0.7%
21 Hongkong Asia/Paci¯c 2000 2000 0.7%
22 Jakarta Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 0.0%
23 Kuala Lumpur Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 0.1%
24 Phillippine Asia/Paci¯c - 2001 - 0.0%
25 Singapore SGXy Asia/Paci¯c - 1999 2000 0.2%
26 Taiwan Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 1.8%
27 Thailand Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 0.1%
28 Tokyo Asia/Paci¯c - 2001 - 4.8%
Total 11 17 9 85.2%
*: Athens Stock Exchange in 1999
y: Pro forma ¯gures for 1999
Table 1: Sample of exchanges used in the analysis, 1999-2003
The sample encompasses ¯ve exchanges from the Americas, fourteen from Eu-
rope/Africa and nine from the Asia/Paci¯c region. All relevant accounting and
transaction data have been converted into US-dollars and adjusted for in°ation.35
Although the sample lacks completeness of the whole exchange population, it does
33Confer our explanation in section 2.2, formula (6) and footnote 27.
34In order to employ White-corrected estimators to control for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity
we use EViews 5 as statistical package. For the Tobit-regressions we will utilize Stata 8 as EViews
does not provide a panel data version for censored data.
35The accounting data was acquired from the annual reports of the exchanges, whereas transac-
tion and other descriptive data was obtained from the databases of the World Federation of Stock
Exchanges (FIBV), the Federation of European Stock Exchanges (FESE), the HP Handbook of
World Stock, Derivatives & Commodity Exchanges 2001, 2002 and 2003, direct correspondence
with the exchanges, company web sites and general internet research.
15comprise on average 85% of the total equity trading volume on stock exchanges
reported to the World Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV) by roughly 75 ex-
changes.36 The sample includes 17 demutualized exchanges of which nine entities
have also gone public, whereas eleven exchanges remain governed by a mutual struc-
ture or are partially state-controlled.37 We include 100% of all publicly listed ex-
changes in our study. However, the portion of mutuals and demutualized exchanges
lies at a mere 50%38, respectively. This is due to the lack of comprehensive disclo-
sure requirements for demutualized and mutual exchanges in some countries, which
makes the gathering of information on their ¯nancial statements impossible. Hence,
these two groups are underrepresented.
3.2 Variables
Table 2 provides an overview of the two di®erent sets of variables employed in the
analysis. They will be discussed in detail in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Accompanying
descriptive statistics on the variables are given in Appendix A.
3.2.1 Operational variables
In the ¯rst stage, the DEA and Malmquist-index calculations will be based on
variables that are directly related to the operations of an exchange and can be
in°uenced by the management. An appropriate choice of variables that represent
the "production process" of an exchange is not a clear-cut task. When considering
plausible input variables, it seems sensible to cover both capital and labor aspects
of the production process. Thus, labor will be approximated by the number of sta®
working for an exchange i in period t (x1
i;t) whereas the utilization of capital for
investments such as the setup of an IT-infrastructure, a trading space and the nec-
essary buildings are subsumed by the value of tangible assets employed at exchange
i in period t (x2
i;t).
On the output side, four di®erent services are considered that are 'produced' by
an exchange. The variable y1
i;t stands for the number of listed companies at exchange
i in period t. It will be used as a proxy for the exchange's e®ort to monitor the
listed ¯rms on the exchange in order to ensure fair trading and equal disclosure
practices of company-speci¯c information. Thus, the supervision of listed ¯rms can
be regarded as a service for trading participants to achieve market transparency.
Secondly, the total trading volume in equities as well as in bonds will approximate
the activities of exchange i on the cash market in period t (y2
i;t).39 As several
exchanges have diversi¯ed their businesses into related activities such as derivatives
36Trading volume data from (alternative) electronic trading platforms and from banks that
internalize customer orders are not taken into account. We acknowledge that these forms of equity
trading gained considerable importance in recent years. Nevertheless, it is not possible to include
these ¯gures in a comprehensive and coherent fashion.
37For convenience reasons, the paper will denote the last type of governance structure merely
as 'mutual'.
38As a percentage of the world's ¯fty largest stock exchanges according to FIBV.
39The employment of the number of transactions performed on an exchange would have been a
more precise measure of the activity. Unfortunately, this sort of data was not available for all 28
exchanges.
16FIRST STAGE: Operational Variables
Inputs
x
1
i;t Number of sta® employed at exchange i in period t (year-end ¯gures)
x
2
i;t Tangible assets at exchange i in period t (in thousand dollars)
Outputs
y
1
i;t Number of listed companies at exchange i in period t
y
2
i;t Total trading volume in bonds and shares at exchange i in period t (in million dollars)
y
3
i;t Total number of derivatives contracts traded at exchange i in period t
y
4
i;t Post-trading services and software sales at exchange i in period t (in thousand dollars)
SECOND STAGE: Framework Variables
Governance
DEMUTi;t Dummy variable for demutualized exchange i in period t
LISTEDi;t Dummy variable for publicly listed exchange i in period t
Competitive Position and Attractiveness of the Capital Market
LIQUIDITYi;t Level of liquidity at exchange i in period t. Liquidity is de¯ned as the ratio of
annual trading volume in domestic equity and market capitalization of domestic ¯rms.
(year-end ¯gures, in %)
¢TRADINGi;t Relative y-o-y change in equity trading at exchange i from period t-1 to period t.
The exchange's percentage change in trading volume is deducted
by the sample median change of trading volume (year-end ¯gures, in %)
FOREIGN LISTINGi;t World market share in new listings of foreign companies at exchange i
in period t measured as the portion of new foreign listings at exchange i
compared to the total number of new foreign listings worldwide (year-end ¯gures, in %).
Financial Flexibility
¢LTFINANCEi;t Growth of equity and long term debt on exchange i's balance sheet
from period t-1 to period t. (book values, year-end ¯gures, in %)
Business Model
OUTSOURCINGi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i has outsourced its IT-system
in period t.
HORIZONTALi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i operates a derivatives platform
in period t.
VERTICALi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i provides post-trading services
in period t.
FULL INTEGRATIONi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i is both vertically
and horizontally integrated in period t.
Control Variable for Productivity Regressions
¢EFFi;t¡1 Corresponding e±ciency values (CRS or VRS) of exchange i in period t-1.
Table 2: Variables used in the two-stage process
trading and post-trading services as well as into the development and maintenance
of exchange-related software systems, it is necessary to include them in the output
set.40 Therefore, variable y3
i;t captures the total number of derivative contracts
traded on the forward markets. Variable y4
i;t represents the revenues from post-
40As a consequence, some exchanges, that do not provide these type of activities, will display a
zero output on these variables in the data set. This contradicts the claim of the DEA literature
requiring that all inputs and outputs need to be strictly positive. However, when checking the
volatility of the attained results by assigning small positive values to these output variables instead
of zeros, the results of DEA do not change. This is due to fact that the DEA-optimization gives
a zero weighting on those outputs in any case.
17trading activities and software sales at exchange i in period t. The use of revenue
numbers for the latter variable is not the most appropriate ¯gure to be included in
the output set. The number of clearing and settlement transactions serviced and
the number of software systems sold would have been better proxies. However, due
to the lack of this type of data for all exchanges in our sample, we opted for this
proceeding.
Before proceeding to the next paragraph a few words should be devoted to the
choice of the proper DEA-model as was mentioned earlier in footnote 17. Consid-
ering the applied inputs and outputs in this paper, it makes sense to employ an
input-oriented DEA-model since the number of sta® and the tangible assets of an
exchange can be more directly altered by the management than the level of de-
mand for their products and services. Thus, the management's e®ort to reduce the
exchange's inputs seems to be a fairer yardstick than its exertion to augment the
venue's output levels.
3.2.2 Framework variables
The second stage considers additional determinants arising from the framework
in which an exchange is embedded and that may also have an in°uence on its
performance. As noted by Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p.53-54), the variables
of the second stage may have an impact on the e±ciency with which inputs are
transformed to outputs, but they should not a®ect the production process itself.
Thus, the authors maintain the requirement that the variables of the ¯rst and
second stage are uncorrelated.41 We will consider four types of factors that deserve
particular attention and present corresponding variables that will function as proxies
in our regressions. These are (1) the exchange's corporate governance regime (2)
the competitive environment and the attractiveness of the exchange's home capital
market (3) the exchange's ¯nancial °exibility and (4) the exchange's business model.
Governance We consider three di®erent governance regimes, namely a (1) mutual
structure (2) a demutualized, customer-dominated structure and (3) a demutual-
ized, outsider-dominated structure. The distinction between the latter two forms is
whether the stock exchange is publicly listed. We thus assume that a demutualized
but unlisted exchange is more or less controlled by its old stakeholders, i.e. its cus-
tomers. Exchanges that are publicly listed usually possess a large fraction of outside
owners so that we feel comfortable to denote these venues as outsider-dominated. To
operationalize the distinctions, we de¯ne two dummy variables as shown in table 2.
The variables can take the following con¯gurations: (1) A mutual exchange, denoted
as DEMUT = 0^LISTED = 0, i.e. neither demutualized nor listed. (2) A demu-
tualized exchange, denoted as DEMUT = 1^LISTED = 0, i.e. demutualized but
not listed. (3) A publicly listed exchange, denoted as DEMUT = 1^LISTED = 1,
41However, for some of our variables we cannot maintain this point as can be seen in appendix C,
where table 6 displays the correlation among the employed variables. In particular the correlation
between the ¯rst stage variables x1, x2, y1, and y2 with the second stage variables FOREIGN
LISTING and LIQUIDITY is highly positive. Therefore our coe±cient estimates may possess
some bias. Nevertheless, our ¯ndings remain robust when we drop the latter variables from our
regressions as displayed in table 7.2.
18i.e. both demutualized and listed.42 Note that the LISTED-variable will only dis-
play the additional in°uence, i.e. on top of being demutualized, on stock exchange
e±ciency and productivity. Ex ante, we would expect that both demutualized
and listed exchanges will outperform mutuals in both e±ciency and productivity
scores. Furthermore, since some authors emphasize the importance of being pub-
licly listed for a successful restructuring43, we expect a stronger performance by
outsider-dominated exchanges.
Competition and attractiveness of capital market A meaningful variable
that captures the exchange's competitive environment and the general attractive-
ness of its home capital market, is di±cult to ¯nd.44 Nevertheless, since the omit-
tance of competitive pressure and capital market attractiveness as an in°uencing
variable would not be satisfactory, a crude measurement is attempted. In the fol-
lowing we present three variables that accentuate distinct aspects.
Our ¯rst variable, denoted as LIQUIDITY , measures the depth of the market
operated by an exchange and thereby provides a proxy for an exchange's importance
and market power. A common way to calculate the existing level of liquidity on an
exchange's trading platform is simply to divide the annual (equity) trading volume
by the market capitalization of the ¯rms listed on the exchange.
The second variable, denoted as ¢TRADING, proxies an exchange's perfor-
mance capturing year-on-year changes in the competitive position. To operational-
ize, we employ year-on-year (y-o-y) changes in equity trading volume at an exchange.
In order to control for broader market movements we deduct from each exchange's
y-o-y performance the median change of the sample in the respective period. The
rationale behind this procedure is the following: A relative gain in trading vol-
ume, i.e. the exchange was able to capture more trading volume than the median
exchange of the sample, signals a relatively strong competitive position vis-µ a-vis
other exchanges. By contrast, a relative loss in trading volume would suggest a
deterioration in the competitive position.
42Note that the con¯guration DEMUT = 0 ^ LISTED = 1 does not exist, since all listed
exchanges underwent a demutualization process before.
43Confer section 1.
44The relative level of fees charged by an exchange would be the most direct means to measure
the level of competition. Unfortunately, data for the most important types of these fees such as the
observed transaction bid-ask-spread levels and (¯xed) access fees for brokers is not available for
all considered exchanges within the relevant time frame. Other methods such as the Her¯ndahl-
index, which infer information on the competitive environment by calculating the concentration
within an industry are also not directly applicable for two reasons. (1) The number of sizable
competitors within a country is rather limited. In most countries the exchange industry has already
consolidated resulting in one major stock exchange servicing the lion's share of transactions. A
noticeable domestic threat to the incumbent stems from large ¯nancial institutions that internalize
customer trading volume and alternative electronic trading venues. However, it is di±cult to
quantify their trading volumes as was already mentioned in footnote 36. (2) A combination of
several major exchanges from di®erent countries to one region in order to calculate this region's
industry concentration would su®er from the subjectivity when 'creating' sensible regions and
would give each exchange within that region the same value of competitive pressure, which would
be inappropriate to quantify exchange-speci¯c situations.
A more promising method would be the H-statistics introduced by Panzar and Rosse. Andersen
(2003) uses this method and calculates the exchange-speci¯c level of competition. However, the
method demands a comprehensive breakdown of the cost and revenues of the exchange under
consideration, which we do not possess for all exchanges. Additionally, it assumes that the ¯rm
objective is to maximize its pro¯ts, a condition that cannot be maintained for mutual exchanges.
19Our third variable, denoted as FOREIGN LISTING captures the general
attractiveness of the exchange's home capital market by calculating an exchange's
market share in new foreign ¯rms listings as a percentage of the total new foreign
listings worldwide. We believe that this describes the general attractiveness of a
capital market quite well since there are mainly two reason for such a behavior by
a foreign ¯rm: Either the ¯rm is forced to list abroad for its home capital market
is not attractive or it lists itself additionally on foreign exchanges in order to seek
capital from these markets that presumably possess a large and thus attractive pool
of potential investors.45
When we regress these variables against the technical e±ciency and productivity
of an exchange, it is di±cult to establish an ex ante expectation concerning the the-
oretically correct sign of the regression coe±cients. Both directions seem plausible.
Consider for example the LIQUIDITY -variable: An exchange with a relatively
deep market can be considered to be in a strong competitive position which may
result in a better exploitation of its resources and thus in higher e±ciency. The
contrary may also hold as monopolistic inertia symptoms could cause excessive (in-
put) spending and contribute to lower e±ciency values. We would argue that both
directions of the coe±cient's sign of the FOREIGN LISTING-variable can be ex-
plained in a similar fashion. The ¢TRADING-variable may also display di®ering
signs: It could have a positive sign when the relative loss in trading volume causes
a decrease in e±ciency. This will be the case when unfavorable market conditions
coincide with lower absolute equity trading volumes, since this will negatively a®ect
the level of the DEA-output variable y2
i;t and thus ceteris paribus a decrease of the
e±ciency value. Yet, the sign could also be negative when a relative loss in trad-
ing volume means that the exchange overcompensates this by a disproportionate
reduction in the input variables and thereby achieves higher e±ciency values. By
the same token a DMU could spend overly much in its inputs than the increase in
trading volume would allow to do so.
Financial °exibility In reality we observe that several exchanges raised external
funds in order to ¯nance the modernization of their trading venues or to pursue
other projects that were aimed to boost their competitiveness.46 Thus, the ¯nan-
cial °exibility of an exchange, i.e. its ability to raise new funds to ¯nance future
investments may also have an e®ect on an exchange's e±ciency and productivity,
albeit it remains ex ante unclear whether it will be a positive or an adverse one.
On the one hand, it could lead to ine±ciencies due to overinvestments resulting
from (too) abundant funds. On the other, the capability of acquiring new proceeds
could be a necessary prerequisite to induce e±ciency-enhancing investments. We
employ a variable which seeks to capture the exchange's in°ow of new proceeds in
45Support for this notion can be found in an empirical paper on cross-listings by Pagano, Randl,
RÄ oell, and Zechner (2001) who ¯nd that ¯rms seeking cross-listing tend to choose foreign capital
markets with large and liquid markets as well as where investor protection and e±ciency of courts
are high.
46Most explicitly this has occurred at exchanges that went public but one can imagine that -
irrespective of the governance - fresh capital was provided for the exchanges to better cope with
increased competitive pressure.
20long term capital in a certain period. Ideally, we would measure this by looking
at the respective cash °ow statements of each exchange in order to capture the
actual capital in°ow. However, these ¯gures are not available for all exchanges.
Hence, we are forced to use a less accurate means and employ a variable denoted as
¢LTFINANCE, which captures the year-on-year change in equity and long-term
debt as is stated in the exchanges' balance sheets.47
Business model Some exchanges do not develop and operate their trading sys-
tems themselves but buy this service from an external provider. Thus, such an
exchange rather incurs additional operating costs, which primarily materialize in
the pro¯t-loss statement and to a much lesser extent in its sta® size and its tangible
assets, which are the considered input factors in our analysis. Therefore, ignoring
the outsourcing of IT-services would ceteris paribus result in a disadvantage for
exchanges that develop their own trading system by employing sta® and assets for
that matter. Consequently, we need to control for this aspect. We do so by em-
ploying a dummy variable, denoted as OUTSOURCING, which equals one when
the exchange under consideration outsources its trading system. Since outsourcing
ceteris paribus reduces the required input factors and hence increases the calculated
e±ciency values, we would expect a positive coe±cient sign at this variable.
We indicated in section 3.2.1 that several exchanges extended their activities
to other areas besides the classic operation of a cash market. Some exchanges in-
tegrated horizontally by providing an institutionalized derivatives trading venue,
others followed a vertical silo model by integrating post-trading services into the
existing operations. Yet others both integrated vertically and horizontally, which
we denote in the following as 'fully integrated'. As a consequence, there are varying
ways to conduct business in this industry. We believe that we have to control for
this aspect, since di®erent con¯gurations may have di®erent e®ects on exchange
e±ciency and productivity due to potential economies of scope between the afore-
mentioned activities. Consider for example the combination of a cash and a for-
ward market, which could be operated by a single trading system, and therefore
save (input) resources. In a similar fashion one could expect economies of scope
when combining trading and post-trading services by utilizing straight-through-
processing applications.48 We will therefore employ three dummy variables, de-
noted as HORIZONTAL, V ERTICAL, and FULL INTEGRATION, in order
to capture the e®ects of horizontal, vertical and full integration, respectively. Our
ex ante expectation concerning the impact of horizontal and/or vertical integration
is that it should enhance exchange e±ciency and productivity vis-µ a-vis exchanges
that solely operate a cash market.
47In order to prevent distortions from currency °uctuations we use in°ation-adjusted book values
of the exchanges' home currencies.
48Confer Serifsoy and Weiss (2005) for a discussion on the European securities transaction
industry from an industrial organization perspective.
213.3 Results
3.3.1 Results from the ¯rst stage
In Appendix B, table 5 presents the ¯rst-stage results of the DEA-e±ciency and
Malmquist-productivity analysis for both constant and variable returns-to-scale.49
As expected from our discussion in section 2.1 the mean e±ciency values are greater
in the VRS-case than in the CRS-case since the VRS-e±cient frontiers "envelop"
the observations more closely. While this e®ect is relatively moderate for most of the
observations, it boosts the e±ciency values of some smaller DMUs like the exchanges
of Vienna, Budapest and Malta considerably. Furthermore, the VRS-case computes
four exchanges, namely Copenhagen, Deutsche BÄ orse, Euronext and Malta, that
are fully e±cient in all ¯ve considered periods, whereas there are only two such
cases in the CRS-environment (Copenhagen and Euronext). When focusing on
productivity growth, both underlying technologies display an overall increase in
mean productivity except for the 2001/2002-period where we calculated an overall
stagnation in factor productivity. The most remarkable increase is accomplished by
the Brazilian exchange BOVESPA, which improved its productivity by an annual
arithmetic average of 29% to 34% for the respective settings.
3.3.2 Results from the second stage
Table 3 displays the results from the regression analysis using the ¯rst stage re-
sults as dependent variables as was outlined in section 2.4. The table presents the
results of White-corrected regressions against DEA-e±ciency (EFF), Malmquist-
productivity (MQ), change in technical e±ciency (¢EFF) and progress in tech-
nology (¢TECH). The table is divided into two panels. The left panel displays
the results for constant returns-to-scale. The right panel provides our estimations
when assuming variable returns-to-scale. We indicated the coe±cients' levels of
signi¯cance by the symbols y, ¤, ¤¤, ¤ ¤ ¤, representing 15%, 10%, 5% and 1%
signi¯cance levels, respectively. Additionally, we numerated the columns (2-9) for
convenience. Overall, the R2-values of the productivity regressions are reasonable,
save for the less appealing values in columns ¯ve and nine. For the two Tobit e±-
ciency regressions we display the respective Wald-Â2-values in columns two and six.
When comparing the individual coe±cients between the two panels we ¯nd that
their signs, if they are signi¯cant, do not change. The results of the Hausman test
demonstrate that a random e®ects model is likely to produce inconsistent estimates
for our productivity regressions in all but one case (column nine), since the p-values
display a highly signi¯cant rejection of the null-hypothesis. Thus, the use of the
¯xed e®ects model is more appropriate.
In°uence of competition, ¯nancial °exibility, e±ciency The results from
the variables representing the competitive environment show that a favorable mar-
ket environment tends to improve the e±ciency of exchanges. This is particularly
49We are grateful to Holger Scheel whose program 'EMS' we utilized for the calculation of the
e±ciency and productivity scores.
22Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.133*** 0.001 -0.161*** 0.187** 0.191*** -0.083*** -0.107*** 0.025
Std. Err. 0.047 0.049 0.044 0.081 0.063 0.030 0.030 0.025
LISTED 0.040 -0.001 -0.083 0:060y 0.091 0.054 -0.068 0.127**
Std. Err. 0.068 0.113 0.092 0.041 0.079 0.117 0.092 0.058
LIQUIDITY 0.006 -0.032*** -0.002 -0.040 -0.034 -0.021 0.059 -0.063
Std. Err. 0.031 0.011 0.022 0.034 0.043 0.054 0.063 0.087
¢TRADING -0.002 0.008 -0.037 0.060 0.083* 0.040 0.003 0.059
Std. Err. 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.054 0.047 0.039 0.073 0.077
FOREIGN LISTING 1.804*** 0:874y -0.566 1.609* 2.347*** -0.271 -0.109 -0.218
Std. Err. 0.388 0.61 0.848 0.900 0.687 0.868 0.503 1.007
¢LT FINANCE -0.004 -0.029 0.029 -0.084*** -0.007 -0.026 0.054 ¡0:095y
Std. Err. 0.033 0.069 0.071 0.018 0.041 0.073 0.048 0.060
OUTSOURCING 0.045 -0.343*** -0.498*** 0.187 -0.009 -0.400*** -0.450*** 0:099y
Std. Err. 0.059 0.051 0.056 0.078 0.065 0.132 0.088 0.070
HORIZONTAL -0.039 ¡0:214y -0.300** 0.132 0.150** -0.085 -0.154*** 0.053
Std. Err. 0.068 0.154 0.134 0.098 0.076 0.129 0.050 0.098
VERTICAL -0.006 -0.153** -0.247** 0.137 0.180** -0.128*** -0.116*** -0.010
Std. Err. 0.086 0.065 0.120 0.138 0.085 0.048 0.044 0.053
FULL INTEGRATION -0.101 0.029 -0.127 0.147 0.164** 0:145y -0.041 0.153*
Std. Err. 0.085 0.081 0.093 0.140 0.085 0.092 0.044 0.092
EFF -1.096*** -1.003*** -0.096 -0.634*** -1.033*** 0.329**
Std. Err. 0.328 0.351 0.116 0.239 0.312 0.158
CONST 0.592*** 1.923*** 2.032*** 0.888*** 0.654*** 1.674*** 1.977*** 0.766***
Std. Err. 0.080 0.189 0.151 0.047 0.086 0.142 0.211 0.129
Observations 140 112 112 112 140 112 112 112
WaldÂ2=R2(adj:) 54.83 0.334 0.417 0.082 55.28 0.285 0.372 -0.070
Hausman Test (p) - 0.0000 0.0000 0.1097 - 0.0012 0.0000 0.6077
Table 3: Results from the second-stage regression analysis
true when focusing on the variables ¢TRADING and FOREIGN LISTING in
the VRS-setting (column six). They display a signi¯cantly positive relationship to-
wards e±ciency which implies that exchanges that possess an above sample-median
performance in trading volume development and that are more attractive for for-
eign issuers are on average also more e±cient. In the CRS-environment the case
is less pronounced since the ¢TRADING variable is insigni¯cant (column two).
The impact of LIQUIDITY on e±ciency remains insigni¯cant in both technology
settings. The in°uence of the competition variables on the exchanges' productivity
is mixed in the CRS-case. An attractive capital market seems to have a positive ef-
fect on overall productivity, whereas the contrary holds for higher levels of liquidity.
The competition variables in the VRS-setting are insigni¯cant.
Our variable representing the ¯nancial °exibility of an exchange, i.e. ¢LT
FINANCE, displays no signi¯cant result except for a negative relation with tech-
nological progress (column ¯ve and nine). Thus, additional funds do not seem to
have a positive e®ect on the performance of an exchange.
The control variable EFF shows that productivity indeed is lower for exchanges
that possess higher e±ciency values (columns three and seven). Thus, productivity
gains are easier to accomplish for exchanges with lower e±ciency values.
In°uence of business model From our OUTSOURCING variable we infer
that outsourcing has no signi¯cant e®ect on stock exchange e±ciency, while it
signi¯cantly reduces overall productivity (columns three and seven). Focusing on
23the sources of this underperformance we observe that this reductions stems primarily
from the negative e®ect on improvements in technical e±ciency (columns four and
eight), while technological progress seems to increase when an exchange outsources
its IT-system. For the latter point,we ¯nd weakly signi¯cant evidence in column
nine.
The in°uence of the three integration dummy variables on stock exchange e±-
ciency is negligible in the CRS-case. In the VRS-setting, all three business con¯g-
urations seem to be superior to the e±ciency of exchanges that merely operate a
cash market. However, our robustness checks displayed in appendix D suggest that
these ¯ndings are not very reliable. Alternations to the model result in a signi¯cant
change of their respective signs. Hence, we would not want to draw any conclusions
with regard to the existence of economies of scope between di®erent activities. On
the other hand, our ¯ndings on productivity are more robust so that some inferences
can be made. Here, horizontally integrated exchanges possess a lower productivity
value than cash markets-only operators in the CRS-case (column three), which is
mainly driven by a weaker performance in e±ciency improvements (column four).
A similar pattern can be observed for vertically integrated exchanges, although this
also seem to hold in the VRS-setting. There is evidence that fully integrated ex-
change have a better performance than cash markets-only venues in the VRS-case
(column seven). However, although this outcome is pretty robust to variations in
the regression model it is not signi¯cant in our bootstrap regressions. Therefore,
we take a rather cautious stance regarding conclusions on their comparative perfor-
mance.
Although some interesting points can be derived from our results so far, we
want to emphasize that the discussed variables were primarily introduced as control
variables. Our main focus aims on the in°uence of our two governance variables,
which will be discussed in the following.
In°uence of governance The DEMUT-variable indicates that demutualized
exchanges possess e±ciency levels that are 13 to 19 percentage points higher than
that of mutual exchanges depending on the technological setting (confer the DEMUT-
coe±cients in columns two and six). Focusing on the Malmquist-regressions in
columns three and seven, we ¯nd no signi¯cant evidence that demutualized ex-
changes have a higher productivity than mutual exchanges in the CRS-case whereas
in the VRS-case they perform even signi¯cantly worse compared to mutuals. The
source of this underperformance is explained in both technology settings by a signif-
icantly lower value in improvements of technical e±ciency (¢EFF) as can be seen
in columns four and eight. According to our estimates demutualized exchanges fare
on average 10-16 percentage points worse on this dimension than mutual exchanges.
The demutualized exchanges' progress in technology, the second component of pro-
ductivity, is signi¯cantly higher in the CRS-case (column ¯ve) by 19 percentage
points. As a result, they are able to compensate their underperformance in the ¯rst
component insofar that the overall productivity converges with that of the mutuals'
average performance. In the VRS-case however, such a recoupment is not observ-
able since their improvements in technology is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero
24(=the mutuals' performance) as can be seen in column nine. As a consequence,
the aforementioned resulting aggregate e®ect for productivity growth is on average
lower vis-µ a-vis the mutuals' performance (column seven).
The LISTED-variable, which indicates the additional e®ects of an outsider-
owned governance structure on e±ciency and productivity remains largely negli-
gible. The only noticeable signi¯cance can be observed in columns ¯ve and nine.
Here, we ¯nd evidence that the observed pattern of demutualized exchanges, i.e. a
higher technological progress, can be found for publicly listed exchanges as well.
Since the variable measure incremental e®ects on top of the DEMUT-variable, we
conclude that this e®ect is more pronounced for listed stock exchanges, namely by
6 and 12 percentage points, depending on the technological setting.
Interpreting the results of the governance variables The productivity
results came a bit surprising to us since we ex ante expected that commercialized
exchanges would have a stronger 'drive' to improve productivity in line with their
pro¯t-maximizing goal. So why are mutuals doing a better job in improving their
technical e±ciency while demutualized and listed exchanges are more apt in im-
proving their technology? A plausible economic interpretation is that governance
restructuring coincides with changes in operations that lead to temporary (techni-
cal) ine±ciencies until the new processes are settled and optimized. The stronger
rise in technological progress of demutualized (and listed) exchanges vis-µ a-vis mu-
tuals may indicate increased employment of electronic trading and processing, a
potential result from the possibility to abandon an archaic trading °oor more eas-
ily in a governance structure where traders have a reduced in°uence on corporate
decisions.50.
In the following, we want to provide some veri¯cation that this interpretation
seems to have some appeal. First, we want to consider the explanation that the
poor performance in improvements in technical e±ciency (¢EFF) of demutual-
ized and listed exchanges could be due to temporary frictions that occur during a
restructuring period. One possible way to quantify this is by looking at the vari-
ation of the exchanges' most relevant input factors, such as its employee numbers
and its assets, over time. If we assume that a stronger variation in these input
variables explains operations restructuring, i.e. hiring additional sta® for certain
new activities and/or reducing employee numbers in unpro¯table segments as well
buying new businesses and/or selling others, and if we further assume that these
extraordinary activities are strongly related to a wider restructuring e®ort which
also includes a governance change, we then should ¯nd a higher variation in these
factors for demutualized and listed exchanges than for mutual enterprises. To ver-
ify our presumption, we pursue the following steps: (1) We calculate the ¯ve year
(1999-2003) mean and standard deviation for each of the 28 exchanges' sta® sizes,
tangible assets and total assets. In order to avoid currency-conversion e®ects on the
values of the assets we employ in°ation-adjusted home currency book values from
the respective balance sheets. (2) By dividing each standard deviation by its corre-
50Confer in particular Steil (2002) who analyzes the causes and consequences of a governance
change on the exchange's trading technology.
25sponding mean, we receive the variation coe±cient of each input variable. This gives
us a percentage value of 'variability' for each input factor and exchange. (3) We
build three subsamples from our sample. The ¯rst group consists of exchanges that
underwent a demutualization process during the analyzed time frame. In order to
have data prior and after the process we focus on those exchanges that demutualized
either in 2000 or 2001. These are the following nine exchanges: Toronto, Deutsche
BÄ orse, Euronext, London Stock Exchange, Hongkong, NASDAQ, Oslo, Philippine
and Tokyo.51 The second group, which functions as a control group, comprises
eleven exchanges that did not change their governance and remained mutuals in
the relevant time period. These are: NYSE, Lima, BOVESPA, Istanbul, Johannes-
burg, Malta, Warsaw, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Taiwan and Thailand. Our third
group, which includes Copenhagen, OM Gruppen, Vienna and Australian Stock Ex-
change, consists of demutualized exchanges that underwent the restructuring prior
to our considered time frame. This group should give us some insights whether the
variability of input variables is di®erent when the demutualization process lies a few
years in the past.52 (4) We compare the three groups by their respective median
variation values.
Figure 4 displays the median variation coe±cients of the three inputs and the
three subsamples. Since the sample of demutualized exchanges (black bars) indeed
exhibit a higher variability than the mutuals (light grey bars) this would con¯rm our
interpretation. Note, also that the variability decreases for the third group (dark
grey bars), which we denoted as 'Old-Demutualized' here. Thus, assuming that the
variability indeed decreases after the demutualization process we would expect that
our ¯rst subgroup may also experience less variability in the future and therefore
stronger improvements in technical e±ciency.
Figure 4: Variation Coe±cients of Inputs by Governance Type
The second point we want to explore is whether there is evidence that the de-
51Although some of these exchanges go a step further by going public it is still reasonable to
subsume these exchanges under one group as the empirical results showed that both groups exhibit
a similar pattern for the ¢EFF and ¢TECH-variables.
52We did not incorporate the remaining four exchanges of our sample into the analysis since they
have either demutualized between 1999 and 2000 or after 2001. Thus, they would have distorted
the comparison, for we wanted to highlight the e®ects of the actual restructuring process.
26mutualization process indeed promotes technology-enhancing measures such as the
increased utilization of an electronic order book (EOB). For this purpose we cal-
culate an exchange's annual percentage value of equity trading volume processed
by an EOB compared to its total equity trading volume. Using the ¯rst and the
second subgroup of exchanges as de¯ned before, we can compare these groups'
annual median values. Unfortunately, comprehensive information on the EOB is
only available for the years 2001 to 200353 so that we cannot provide insights to
the situation prior to the actual demutualization of the exchanges comprising the
¯rst group. Nevertheless, as can be seen from ¯gure 5, we are able to identify an
Figure 5: Percentage of Electronic Trading by Governance Type
increased use of electronic trading within the demutualized group after their re-
structuring in 2000 and 2001. Yet, the increase from 60% of total equity volume
to 73% within three years is dwarfed by the median values of the mutual group.
Here, we observe a slight decline from 100% (!) computerization in 2001 to a still
very high ¯gure of 89%. Thus, while we can con¯rm our notion that demutualized
exchanges indeed increasingly substitute their trading °oors by computerized trad-
ing systems the ¯ndings also suggest that there is no con¯rmation of the argument
brought forward by Steil (2002, p.62-68) that demutualization is a necessary step to
overcome the brokers' resistance against an electronic order book. In the contrary,
the eleven mutual exchanges under consideration used computerized trading much
more intensively than the exchanges in the subsample of demutualized exchanges.54
The apparent prevalence of a modern trading infrastructure at mutual exchanges
would also explain why they perform weaker on the ¢TECH-variable: There just
53Confer to the FIBV.
54They might have even overdone it as we observe a decline between 2001 and 2003. This could
be explained by a return to manually executed trading for stock orders that potentially possess a
strong market impact as °oor brokers may handle certain orders more intelligently than electronic
trading systems. Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2004) ¯nd evidence for this reasoning at the
American Stock Exchange.
27might be no further obvious ways to improve their technology as dramatically as
the demutualized exchanges were able to do it, for the latter still heavily used
non-electronic trading platforms. Hence, the only way to improve productivity at
these mutuals was possible by economizing existing processes, which may give an
alternative reasoning for their higher ¢EFF-values.
Robustness of ¯ndings To check the robustness of our results, in particular of
our ¯ndings on the two governance variables DEMUT and LISTED, we conducted
several robustness checks. On the one hand, we changed the composition of our
regression model in several ways to verify whether this has any signi¯cant impact
on our governance variables. On the other hand, we veri¯ed the validity of our
inference by using bootstrapped standard errors for our regressions.55 In appendix
D we present tables 7 and 8 that indicate the results of the alternations to our
model. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 display the impact on the governance variables when
the variables describing the ¯nancial background and business models as well as
the competitive situation of an exchange are omitted, respectively. Tables 8.1 and
8.2 show regressions where competition-variables are substituted by other variables
from the same ¯eld. Our alternations focus primarily on competition variables
since here we have the least certainty about the appropriateness of the employed
variables. To be more precise, in table 8.1 we replace the ¢TRADING-variable by
the same variable with a one-year lag in order to provide more reaction time for the
management to act on changing market circumstances. Table 8.2 displays the results
when substituting the ¢TRADING-variable by a ¢LIQUIDITY -variable, which
provides information on the y-o-y change in liquidity subtracted by the median
liquidity change of the whole sample. Finally, table 9 shows our regression results
when utilizing the bootstrap method.
Overall, we ¯nd that the governance variables' coe±cients from our original re-
gression model are very robust. There are very few changes in the coe±cients' signs
and all of those occur for coe±cients that have been insigni¯cant in the original
regression or turn insigni¯cant during the robustness check. Also the coe±cients'
signi¯cance is hardly a®ected by regression model variations. The results of our
bootstrap-estimates show that the coe±cients of the DEMUT-variable turn in-
signi¯cant in the VRS-case which weakens our prior ¯nding that the demutualized
exchanges' productivity is signi¯cantly worse than that of mutual exchanges.
55In particular, we replicated a random drawing with replacement from our sample 2000 times
in order to derive a frequency distribution of coe±cient estimates that allows us to estimate a
sample-speci¯c standard error. Furthermore, we constructed 90% and 95%-con¯dence intervals
by using the 2.5%, 5% and the 95%, 97.5% percentiles of the distribution, respectively. We also
controlled for our panel data structure by using clusters. Confer Bradley and Tibshirani (1993)
for an elaborate discussion on bootstrapping.
284 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the e±ciency and productivity of the stock exchange industry
for the years 1999 to 2003. The chief aim of this research was to provide an empirical
contribution to the growing literature on exchange demutualization since some of
the points made by other authors rely mostly on anecdotal evidence. Contrary to
the statements of some researchers our ¯ndings do not support the view that an
outsider dominated exchange is a precondition for dealing adequately with increased
levels of competition in this industry. Therefore, the case for an IPO, a measure that
involves considerable one-o® and additional running costs cannot be advocated from
a technical e±ciency perspective. However, a demutualization process that retains
the exchange's customers as its main owners but realigns the ownership structure,
for example more in congruence with the customer's respective volume of conducted
business, seems promising from a technical e±ciency point of view. Assuming that
productivity growth will also improve when the restructuring process is completed,
this would make this decision even more sensible.
Another point that is commonly advanced in the literature is challenged by
this paper: The assumption that a demutualization process is necessary to install
modern trading systems cannot be empirically con¯rmed. In the contrary, the
mutual exchanges in our sample have a persistently higher portion of electronic
trading than the demutualized and listed exchanges of our sample. Thus, it seems
that mutual exchanges are well aware of the necessity to adapt to new trading
technologies without changing their governance structure substantially.
We conclude that the rationale behind an IPO seems not primarily driven by
e±ciency-enhancing motives. An IPO is more likely to be used as a solution vehicle
for the diverging interests between (few) large international ¯nancial intermediaries
and (many) small local brokers. The exchange's old owners possibly viewed a public
listing as a catalyst to both maximizing the value of their venue and creating an
exit option for those members that were unwilling to bear the costs of a operations
restructuring. The fact that most of these IPOs occurred during the bull market
until 2000/01, where relatively high sales prices were feasible, further strengthens
this argument. Therefore, in anticipation of a substantial appreciation of the value
of their voting rights, many small broker gave up their reluctance to demutualize
and their hitherto relatively large share of the control structure in favor of cashing
out these rights on the securities market. Hence, in the spirit of the theoretical
¯ndings by Hart and Moore (1996), we would speculate that the severeness of the
con°icting interests among former members of an exchange in°uenced the respective
exchanges' decisions on the appropriate governance regime. Exchanges that possess
a relatively homogeneous member structure were able to respond to a changing
environment without signi¯cantly altering their structure. On the other dimension's
end, exchanges with a highly heterogeneous composition could not overcome their
con°icts other than providing side payments via an IPO to resolve deadlocks on
important decisions concerning the exchange's future strategy.
29A Descriptive Statistics
Operational Variables
INPUTS x1 x2
Sta® Tangible Assets
(No. Employed) ($ 000)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 558.5 494.4 52,131 74,936
2000 591.0 503.3 58,622 85,873
2001 615.0 529.7 69,657 94,969
2002 682.3 720.6 74,925 104,044
2003 658.1 696.8 79,959 107,562
OUTPUTS y1 y2 y3 y4
Listing Cash Trading Derivatives Trading Settlement/Software
(No. of companies) (Volume in $ 000 000) (No. of contracts in 000) ($ 000)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 858.1 1071.1 1,432,736 2,629,916 26,430 76,181 20,228 45,169
2000 876.3 1056.7 1,942,741 4,208,753 33,024 89,092 27,044 56,448
2001 817.5 924.7 1,359,079 2,842,350 47,298 124,285 31,500 65,918
2002 797.9 868.3 1,248,960 2,446,333 63,260 174,780 46,235 111,907
2003 901.2 1007.3 1,219,142 2,321,408 74,936 198,740 66,019 179,856
Resulting Dependent Variables for the Second Stage
EFF (CRS) EFF (VRS)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 0.613 0.289 0.685 0.287
2000 0.642 0.293 0.724 0.275
2001 0.632 0.271 0.754 0.260
2002 0.610 0.286 0.766 0.297
2003 0.586 0.328 0.666 0.314
MQ (CRS) ¢EFF (CRS) ¢TECH (CRS)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999-2000 1.067 0.263 1.088 0.293 0.761 0.273
2000-2001 1.021 0.288 1.034 0.295 0.992 0.079
2001-2002 0.994 0.188 0.967 0.222 1.049 0.168
2002-2003 1.141 0.259 0.938 0.261 1.248 0.203
MQ (VRS) ¢EFF (VRS) ¢TECH (VRS)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999-2000 1.086 0.240 1.105 0.271 0.997 0.138
2000-2001 1.009 0.241 1.104 0.343 0.992 0.079
2001-2002 0.998 0.123 0.993 0.187 1.049 0.168
2002-2003 1.077 0.213 0.893 0.191 1.248 0.203
Independent Framework Variables of the Second Stage
DEMUT LISTED OUTSOURCING HORIZONTAL VERTICAL
Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum
1999 6 2 5 11 4
2000 11 5 7 10 5
2001 15 8 7 10 5
2002 17 9 8 9 4
2003 17 9 7 7 4
FOREIGN LISTING LIQUIDITY FULL INTEGRATION
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Sum
1999 0.026 0.046 0.680 0.535 5
2000 0.031 0.071 1.038 1.103 5
2001 0.028 0.058 0.812 0.746 7
2002 0.028 0.059 0.881 0.772 9
2003 0.013 0.021 0.699 0.518 10
¢ LT FINANCE ¢ TRADING
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1998-1999 0.416 0.899 0.130 0.614
1999-2000 0.165 0.271 0.030 0.515
2000-2001 0.286 0.392 -0.006 0.292
2001-2002 0.095 0.240 0.035 0.275
2002-2003 0.079 0.273 0.101 0.388
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Employed First and Second Stage Variables
30B First Stage Results
Constant-Returns-To-Scale
DEA Technical E±ciency Malmquist Prod. Index
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03
NASDAQ 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.64 0.72 1.00 0.79 0.81 1.23
NYSE 0.45 0.49 0.66 0.60 0.49 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.95
Toronto TSX 0.74 0.79 0.53 0.72 1.00 0.97 0.71 1.43 1.80
Lima 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.81 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.05
BOVESPA 0.34 0.50 0.61 0.89 1.00 1.44 1.37 1.23 1.32
Hellenic 0.55 1.00 0.45 0.28 0.35 1.68 0.44 0.78 1.69
Budapest 0.23 0.24 0.47 0.48 0.66 1.10 1.86 0.65 1.50
Copenhagen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00
Deutsche BÄ orse 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.64
Euronext 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.00
Istanbul 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.11 1.06 0.92 0.74 1.07
Johannesburg JSE 1.00 0.81 0.72 0.72 0.41 0.88 0.83 0.89 0.73
London 0.83 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.06 1.00 1.01
Malta 0.41 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.69 0.82 1.22 1.09
Oslo 0.67 0.71 0.70 0.50 0.37 1.01 0.96 0.69 0.97
OM Gruppen 0.91 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.67 0.98 1.00
SWX Zurich 0.69 1.00 0.78 1.00 1.00 1.59 0.84 1.08 1.08
Vienna 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.44 0.26 0.98 0.97 1.25 1.01
Warsaw 0.31 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.92 0.80 0.96 1.07
Australian 0.90 0.93 0.82 0.85 0.65 1.01 0.94 1.13 1.12
Hongkong 0.42 0.76 0.70 0.54 0.45 1.79 0.88 1.02 1.14
Jakarta 0.33 0.32 0.37 0.48 0.69 0.91 1.05 1.15 1.28
Kuala Lumpur 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.23 0.21 0.92 1.16 0.69 1.26
Philippine 0.45 0.52 0.46 0.44 0.26 1.07 0.95 0.99 1.04
Singapore SGX 1.00 0.57 0.66 0.50 0.26 0.58 1.08 1.06 0.69
Taiwan 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.24 1.10 1.07 1.16 1.04
Thailand 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.95
Tokyo 0.50 0.64 0.90 0.84 0.81 1.08 1.51 1.12 1.22
Mean 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.59 1.07 1.02 0.99 1.14
Standard Deviation 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.26
Variable-Returns-To-Scale
DEA Technical E±ciency Malmquist Prod. Index
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03
NASDAQ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.90 0.94 1.00
NYSE 0.57 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.49 1.31 0.93 0.97 0.98
Toronto TSX 1.00 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.52
Lima 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.03
BOVESPA 0.36 0.53 0.64 0.94 1.00 1.41 1.26 1.22 1.25
Hellenic 0.67 1.00 0.45 0.28 0.37 1.51 0.45 0.75 1.66
Budapest 0.44 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.32 1.24 1.00 1.01
Copenhagen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.00
Deutsche BÄ orse 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.37
Euronext 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00
Istanbul 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.16 0.13 1.09 0.84 0.74 0.97
Johannesburg JSE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.95 0.94 1.00 0.54
London 0.85 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00 1.00
Malta 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.96 0.99 0.98
Oslo 0.83 0.76 0.73 0.54 0.51 0.95 0.96 0.73 1.05
OM Gruppen 0.92 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.66 0.98 1.00
SWX Zurich 0.70 1.00 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.54 0.85 1.08 1.08
Vienna 0.53 0.57 0.62 0.68 0.63 1.00 0.95 1.16 1.02
Warsaw 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.92 0.81 1.00 1.12
Australian 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 1.04 0.98 1.04 1.07
Hongkong 0.43 0.76 0.71 0.59 0.46 1.78 0.88 1.04 1.15
Jakarta 0.35 0.32 0.72 0.82 0.69 0.91 1.37 1.15 1.26
Kuala Lumpur 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.29 0.22 0.92 1.14 0.78 1.23
Philippine 0.53 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.42 1.04 0.96 1.00 1.02
Singapore SGX 1.00 0.58 0.66 0.50 0.27 0.59 1.08 1.06 0.70
Taiwan 0.26 0.33 0.46 0.49 0.25 1.15 1.04 1.16 1.04
Thailand 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.32 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.96
Tokyo 0.51 0.64 0.93 1.00 0.81 1.08 1.46 1.11 1.12
Mean 0.68 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.67 1.09 1.01 1.00 1.08
Standard Deviation 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.21
Table 5: First Stage Results
31C Correlation matrix
E±ciency Regression Variables x
1 x
2 y
1 y
2 y
3 y
4
DEMUT 0.160 0.118 0.110 -0.009 0.223 0.290
LISTED 0.309 0.084 0.085 -0.051 0.308 0.422
LIQUIDITY 0.320 0.394 0.502 0.579 0.163 0.110
¢TRADING 0.007 -0.003 0.084 0.081 -0.070 -0.057
FOREIGN LISTING 0.363 0.602 0.698 0.866 0.017 -0.018
¢LT FINANCE -0.013 -0.065 -0.066 0.011 0.056 0.016
OUTSOURCING -0.379 -0.172 -0.180 -0.081 -0.189 -0.185
HORIZONTAL -0.402 -0.327 -0.338 -0.239 0.008 -0.223
VERTICAL -0.175 -0.185 -0.236 -0.189 -0.138 -0.094
FULL INTEGRATION 0.515 0.120 0.068 -0.074 0.300 0.505
Productivity Regression Variables x
1 x
2 y
1 y
2 y
3 y
4
DEMUT 0.188 0.109 0.074 -0.022 0.221 0.351
LISTED 0.386 0.116 0.041 -0.058 0.299 0.494
LIQUIDITY 0.403 0.439 0.531 0.597 0.193 0.187
¢TRADING 0.035 -0.062 0.035 -0.038 -0.071 -0.075
FOREIGN LISTING 0.403 0.670 0.749 0.892 0.020 -0.013
¢LT FINANCE 0.069 -0.048 0.063 0.071 0.197 0.119
OUTSOURCING -0.382 -0.183 -0.176 -0.086 -0.186 -0.207
HORIZONTAL -0.245 -0.271 -0.249 -0.189 -0.154 -0.132
VERTICAL -0.242 -0.285 -0.320 -0.215 0.079 -0.099
FULL INTEGRATION 0.443 0.160 0.094 -0.094 0.253 0.477
EFF(CRS) 0.266 0.167 0.347 0.313 0.358 0.333
EFF(VRS) 0.162 0.157 0.304 0.313 0.289 0.250
Table 6: Correlation matrix for ¯rst and second stage variables
32D Robustness Checks
Regressions without ¯nancial °exibility and business model variables
7.1 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.123*** 0.056 -0.132* 0.212*** 0.168*** -0.041* -0.095*** 0.057*
Std. Err. 0.046 0.067 0.073 0.091 0.059 0.024 0.015 0.035
LISTED -0.005 -0.047 -0.166 0.103*** -0.003 0.005 -0.139 0.156**
Std. Err. 0.060 0.167 0.149 0.028 0.072 0.161 0.114 0.073
LIQUIDITY 0.006 -0.001 0.033 -0.051* 0.115*** 0.016 0.086* -0.056
Std. Err. 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.031 0.038 0.055 0.051 0.087
¢TRADING -0.010 0.032 -0.019 0.057 -0.012 0.082** 0.027 0.069
Std. Err. 0.037 0.037 0.051 0.058 0.047 0.034 0.073 0.069
FOREIGN LISTING 1.851*** 0:766y -0.814 1.795* 3.161 -0.526 -0.348 -0.196
Std. Err. 0.384 0.544 0.855 0.980 - 0.795 0.470 0.996
EFF -1.147*** -0.979*** -0.178 -0.623** -0.981*** 0.281***
Std. Err. 0.307 0.334 0.139 0.274 0.311 0.113
CONST 0.564*** 1.735*** 1.707*** 1.058*** 0.533 1.513*** 1.748*** 0.835***
Std. Err. 0.038 0.208 0.212 0.071 - 0.211 0.222 0.080
Regressions without competition variables
7.2 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.103 -0.029 -0.135*** 0.123** 0.136* -0.087*** -0.101*** 0.012
Std. Err. 0.100 0.042 0.021 0.057 0.084 0.025 0.031 0.023
LISTED 0.095 -0.008 -0.080 0.048 0.062 0.055 -0.064 0.126*
Std. Err. 0.096 0.105 0.097 0.045 0.093 0.106 0.094 0.068
¢LT FINANCE -0.003 -0.035 0.029 -0.089*** -0.033 -0.019 0.055 -0.086
Std. Err. 0.035 0.068 0.066 0.032 0.044 0.073 0.054 0.063
OUTSOURCING 0.087 -0.340*** -0.484*** 0.172*** 0.033 -0.419*** -0.455*** 0.073
Std. Err. - 0.047 0.037 0.064 - 0.109 0.069 0.057
HORIZONTAL -0.094 -0.142*** -0.263*** 0.171 -0.167* -0.112*** -0.124*** 0.020
Std. Err. 0.111 0.057 0.108 0.133 0.094 0.044 0.051 0.054
VERTICAL -0.071 -0.204 -0.314*** 0.162 0.006 -0.065 -0.163*** 0.087
Std. Err. 0.078 0.170 0.105 0.145 0.095 0.141 0.050 0.143
FULL INTEGRATION -0.160 0.043 -0.161*** 0:209y -0.237** 0.182*** -0.041 0.209*
Std. Err. 0.136 0.091 0.058 0.144 0.116 0.067 0.062 0.113
EFF -1.039*** -1.038*** 0.005 -0.648*** -1.033*** 0.314*
Std. Err. 0.300 0.303 0.054 0.22 0.317 0.165
CONST 0.668*** 1.892*** 2.035*** 0.843*** 0.857*** 1.647*** 2.026*** 0.699***
Std. Err. 0.087 0.184 0.148 0.055 0.097 0.128 0.234 0.159
Table 7: Robustness check by omitting variables
33Regressions with di®erent competition variables
8.1 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
¢TRADINGt¡1 for t (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.111* -0.004 -0.157*** 0.171** 0.107* -0.085** -0.095*** 0.006
Std. Err. 0.060 0.041 0.037 0.072 0.057 0.038 0.033 0.028
LISTED 0.015 0.010 -0.077 0.079** 0.049 0.038 -0.107 0.152**
Std. Err. - 0.112 0.087 0.036 0.069 0.125 0.100 0.070
LIQUIDITY -0.034 -0.041*** 0.011 -0.074* 0:064y -0.03 0.076* ¡0:099y
Std. Err. 0.024 0.016 0.035 0.041 0.044 0.039 0.043 0.066
¢TRADING 0.020* 0.022 0.015 0.035 0.046 -0.034 -0.078* 0.045
Std. Err. 0.010 0.042 0.042 0.039 0.041 0.037 0.046 0.030
FOREIGN LISTING 1.154*** 0:872y -0.643 1.687* 3.120*** -0.184 -0.041 -0.166**
Std. Err. 0.407 0.552 0.853 0.956 0.642 0.842 0.429 0.937
¢LT FINANCE 0.009 -0.025 0.026 -0.070*** -0.001 -0.025 0.044 -0.081
Std. Err. 0.031 0.062 0.076 0.024 0.040 0.077 0.047 0.040
OUTSOURCING 0.109 -0.345*** -0.479*** 0.162*** 0.156*** -0.421*** -0.457*** 0.074
Std. Err. - 0.050 0.041 0.052 0.062 0.11 0.057 0.063
HORIZONTAL -0.017 -0.129*** -0.244** 0.189 -0.140** -0.149*** -0.192*** 0.052
Std. Err. 0.037 0.022 0.123 0.185 0.072 0.05 0.046 0.071
VERTICAL -0.008 -0.206 -0.307*** 0.158 0.098 -0.081 -0.174*** 0.083
Std. Err. 0.045 0.15 0.122 0.124 0.082 0.121 0.053 0.122
FULL INTEGRATION -0.088 0.052 -0.146* 0.222 -0.146* 0.152* -0.100 0.239*
Std. Err. - 0.095 0.088 0.180 0.083 0.09 0.080 0.128
EFF -1.104*** -1.000*** -0.119 -0.624*** -1.008*** 0.313**
Std. Err. 0.311 0.351 0.125 0.239 0.307 0.148
CONST 0.578 1.923*** 2.019*** 0.902*** 0.718*** 1.684*** 1.985*** 0.772***
Std. Err. - 0.18 0.152 0.038 0.085 0.137 0.201 0.122
8.2 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
¢LIQUIDITY for ¢TRADING (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.129*** -0.002 -0.156*** 0.177** 0.172** -0.090** -0.108*** 0.015
Std. Err. 0.048 0.044 0.042 0.076 0.078 0.038 0.037 0.030
LISTED 0.039 0.005 -0.079 0:059y 0.021 0.058 -0.070 0.134**
Std. Err. 0.073 0.107 0.088 0.040 0.085 0.114 0.094 0.061
LIQUIDITY 0.009 -0.084** -0.026 -0.049 0.048 -0.065 0.076** -0.128**
Std. Err. 0.031 0.041 0.037 0.035 0.047 0.055 0.039 0.067
D LIQUIDITY -0.021 -0.069** -0.058 0.024 -0.018 -0.037 0.025 -0.057***
Std. Err. 0.037 0.035 0.044 0.030 0.051 0.032 0.021 0.017
FOREIGN LISTING 1.796*** 1.060* -0.489 1.655* 3.107*** -0.094 -0.184 0.049
Std. Err. 0.383 0.567 0.803 0.94 0.663 0.939 0.433 1.021
DELTA LT FINANCE -0.007 -0.030 0.022 -0.074*** -0.013 -0.020 0.054 ¡0:086y
Std. Err. 0.033 0.067 0.077 0.021 0.041 0.071 0.053 0.055
OUTSOURCING 0.047 -0.362*** -0.493*** 0.165*** 0.158** -0.427*** -0.446*** 0.058
Std. Err. 0.061 0.038 0.043 0.062 0.077 0.121 0.076 0.059
HORIZONTAL -0.044 -0.149*** -0.257** 0.155 -0.105 -0.115*** -0.116** 0.010
Std. Err. 0.071 0.062 0.120 0.148 0.083 0.044 0.055 0.056
VERTICAL -0.006 -0.222 -0.320*** 0.153 0.071 -0.079 -0.148*** 0.06
Std. Err. 0.084 0.166 0.132 0.119 0.09 0.126 0.057 0.116
FULL INTEGRATION -0.100 0.047 -0.148** 0.192 -0.165* 0.183*** -0.041 0.210*
Std. Err. 0.086 0.103 0.073 0.159 0.089 0.073 0.067 0.121
EFF -1.079*** -0.981*** -0.114 -0.643*** -1.027*** 0.315**
Std. Err. 0.329 0.355 0.119 0.246 0.314 0.150
CONST 0.595*** 1.957*** 2.048*** 0.895*** 0.701*** 1.710*** 1.958*** 0.820***
Std. Err. 0.081 0.157 0.134 0.032 0.092 0.144 0.224 0.114
Table 8: Robustness check with varying competition variables
34Regressions with Bootstrapping (2000 Replications, 5%and 10%-Levels)
9 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
Bootstrapping (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.133* 0.001 -0.161* 0.187** 0.191** -0.083 -0.107 0.025
Std. Err. 0.097 0.106 0.098 0.047 0.133 0.091 0.097 0.055
LISTED 0.040 -0.001 -0.083 0.060 0.091 0.054 -0.068 0.127*
Std. Err. 0.150 0.159 0.129 0.062 0.201 0.160 0.124 0.079
LIQUIDITY 0.006 -0.032 -0.002 -0.040 -0.034 -0.021 0.059 -0.063
Std. Err. 0.065 0.105 0.106 0.080 0.094 0.059 0.092 0.089
¢TRADING -0.002 0.008 -0.037 0.060 0.083** 0.040 0.003 0.059
Std. Err. 0.049 0.066 0.066 0.059 0.060 0.057 0.091 0.074
FOREIGN LISTING 1.803** 0.874 -0.566 1.609** 2.347* -0.271 -0.109 -0.218
Std. Err. 0.914 0.926 0.873 0.906 1.336 0.880 0.983 0.896
¢LT FINANCE -0.045 -0.029 0.029 -0.084 -0.007 -0.026 0.054 -0.095*
Std. Err. 0.037 0.123 0.091 0.060 0.067 0.076 0.061 0.059
OUTSOURCING 0.045 -0.343** -0.498** 0.187 -0.010 -0.400* -0.450** 0.099
Std. Err. 0.097 0.240 0.190 0.145 0.158 0.282 0.228 0.138
HORIZONTAL -0.039 -0.214** -0.300* 0.132 0.150* -0.085 -0.154 0.053
Std. Err. 0.129 0.160 0.145 0.160 0.191 0.140 0.221 0.199
VERTICAL -0.006 -0.153 -0.247 0.137 0.180 -0.128 -0.116 -0.010
Std. Err. 0.208 0.294 0.211 0.162 0.408 0.300 0.238 0.167
FULL INTEGRATION -0.101 0.029 -0.127 0.147 0.164 0.145 -0.041 0.153
Std. Err. 0.173 0.217 0.163 0.165 0.232 0.194 0.224 0.206
EFF -1.096** -1.002** -0.096 -0.634** -1.033** 0.329**
Std. Err. 0.224 0.192 0.113 0.193 0.165 0.168
CONST 0.592** 1.923** 2.032** 0.888** 0.654** 1.674** 1.977** 0.766**
Std. Err. 0.111 0.219 0.182 0.149 0.170 0.197 0.189 0.179
Table 9: Bootstrap test
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